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Abstract
In this paper, we present two different novel approaches to defend against adversarial examples in
neural networks: attention-based against pixel-based attack and certificate-based against spatially
transformed attack. We discuss the vulnerability of neural networks for adversarial examples,
which significantly hinders their application in security-critical domains. We detail several popular
pixel-based methods of attacking a model. We then walk through current defense methods and
note that they can often be circumvented by adaptive adversaries. For the first contribution,
we take a completely different route by leveraging the definition of adversarial inputs: while
deceiving for deep neural networks, they are barely discernible for human visions. Building upon
recent advances in interpretable models, we construct a new detection framework that contrasts an
input’s interpretation against its classification. We validate the efficacy of this framework through
extensive experiments using benchmark datasets and attacks. We believe that this work opens a
new direction for designing adversarial input detection methods. As for the second contribution,
we discuss a completely different approach to generate adversarial examples, based on the spatial
transformation of an input image. We then extend a currently proposed certificate framework to
this setting and show that the certificate can improve the resilience of a network against adversarial
spatial transformation.
1
1 Introduction
Recent advances in deep learning have led to breakthroughs in long-standing artificial intelligence
tasks, e.g., image classification, speech recognition, and game playing, and enabled use cases
previously considered strictly experimental. Yet, deep neural networks (DNNs) are inherently vul-
nerable to adversarial inputs [1], those maliciously crafted samples to trigger DNNs to misbehave,
which significantly hinders DNN’s application in security-critical domains, such as autonomous
driving or facial recognition. One example of adversarial examples is shown in Fig. 2. To humans,
the two pictures look exactly the same - they are pictures of a horse. However, to a well-trained
neural network, they could be classified as horse and dog, respectively.
Since the discovery of such vulnerabilities [1], a variety of attack models have been proposed
[2], [3], [1]. All these methods share the common trait in that they all add adversarial perturbation
directly to the pixels of the original input, so that the distance between the original image and the
adversarial one remains relatively small while the classification is altered. With such a common
property, the various approaches differ in the way to measure magnitude of perturbations. As it is
still not clear how humans perceive the differences in images, a technical method is often utilized
to carry out the measuring, specifically, the Lp norm. Generally, there are three popular Lp norm
that are used: L∞, L2 and L0.
For example, Jacobian Saliency Map Attack [2] iteratively picks pixels (L0) and perturbs them
according to their effect on achieving misclassification; L-BFGS [1], DeepFool [4], Universal [5],
C&W [3] attacks are all using Euclidean (root-mean-square) method (L2) to measure the influence
of perturbations; while Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [1] change every pixel of the original
image simultaneously (L∞). More detail on each category of attack is deferred to the next section.
On the other hand, a plethora of defense mechanisms has been proposed. The existing methods
can be roughly categorized into two classes: one that reduces the influence of distortion on the
model’s inputs [6], [7], [8], [9] and the other utilizes the model’s outputs to help make more robust
classification [10], [11]. Yet, relying on carefully engineered patterns to distinguish genuine and
adversarial inputs, most of the defenses can often be circumvented by adaptive adversaries or new
attack variants [12].
In this paper, we propose a new detection framework that completely departs from existing
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Figure 1: Example of an adversarial example: both pictures look like horses but the
one on the right can trick neural networks into classifying it as a dog.
efforts. Intuitively, we revisit the fundamental definition of adversarial inputs, which are examples
that can deceive neural networks but not humans, because humans have the ability to extract
the main information from an image and ignore adversarial perturbations. We try to mimic this
ability by leveraging attention mechanisms to generate representative patterns for each class of
the input images. Specifically, our work is inspired by Latent Attention Network (LAN) [13]
which, for each input example, generates a mask, called "attention mask", that represents the
most important pixels of that image when a network tries to classify it. Figure 2 shows images
and their corresponding attention masks. The idea of our detection method is as follows: the
attention mask of an adversarial image remains similar to that of its corresponding benign even
when the image can fool the target classifier. As far as we know, we’re the first to apply an
attention mechanism to the adversarial examples detection. We test our method against state-of-
the-art attacks and we show promising initial results following this idea. We also look into cases
where our approach fails and then point out potential directions for future research.
Furthermore, a different approach to countering adversarial examples is to certify a model
against adversarial perturbations, or to find a tight upper-bound against all possible perturbations.
In [14], the authors train a network and a certificate that guarantee an upper bound of no more
than 35% test error, where each pixel is perturbed by at most 0.1. Even though the author only
applies the method to a rather simple 2-layer network and the dataset MNIST [15], this opens
3
Figure 2: Original images from each class and their masks generated by LAN.
a new direction to guarantee against adversarial examples: provable and certified defense. The
second contribution of this paper draws inspiration from [14] and extends their results to spatially
transformed adversarial examples.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follow:
• We propose an attention-based defend method against pixel-based attacks. We test the
framework with extensive experiments and show promising results.
• We propose a certified and provable defense against spatially transformed adversarial exam-
ples. We show that the certified model is significantly more robust than a vanilla model.
2 Methods of attacking
As mentioned in the previous section, pixel-based attacking methods can be broadly categorized
based on the Lp norm used: L∞, L2, L0. We now detail each category using its representative
method.
2.1 F∞: Fast Gradient Sign Method (FSGM)
FGSM was first proposed in [1], which proposes a theory for why neural networks are susceptible
to adversarial perturbations. [1] suggests that it is the linearity of models that is responsible for
adversarial examples, and proposes a simple method to general adversarial perturbations based
on that theory.
η = sign(∇xJ(θ,x, y)) (1)
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Eq (1) shows their proposed formula, where x is the input, y the ground true label, J the cost
function used to train the model, θ the parameters of the model and  is a small ’step-size’ for the
perturbation. The idea here is to linearize the cost function around the current value of , and ’step’
in the direction obtained from gradients of the lost function to achieve an optimal L∞ perturbation
that can trick the model. This method, though simple to calculate using backpropagation, can
generate reliable adversarial examples over a wide range of models.
2.2 F2: Carlini & Wagner (C&W)
CW attack [3] is considered to be one of the most powerful attacks so far. While it is based on
L2 norm perturbation, the authors also extended it to L∞ and L0. Here, we only consider the
L2 variant of CW as it is considered to have better performance. [3] re-frames the problem of
generating adversarial examples into an optimization problem:
min D(x, x+ δ)
s.t. C(x+ δ) t
(2)
where, D is the distance between the original and perturbed image, δ the adversarial perturbation,
C the model and t the target. However, this reframed version is a highly non-linear constraint
and hard to optimize with, so [3] proposes to optimize this a relaxed version instead:
min D(x, x+ δ) + c · f(x+ δ)
where fadv = max(maxi 6=t Z(xadv)i − Z(xadv)t, k)
(3)
Here, f is the relaxed version of the hard constraint C(x + δ) = t above. f is considered
as adversarial loss, which encourages the target class to have the largest logit, and penalizes the
objective otherwise.
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2.3 Spatially Transformed Adversarial Examples
As opposed to pixel-based perturbations, [16] proposes to use spatial transformation to generate
adversarial samples. The framework can be described as follow. Let x and xˆ be the benign
and adversarial input correspondingly. xˆi denotes the value of xˆ’s i-th pixel and (uˆi, vˆi) denote its
position in xˆ. x is transformed into xˆ using a per-pixel flow field r to generate xˆ with differentiable
bilinear interpolating from x’s pixels. Specifically, xˆi is calculated as:
xˆi =
∑
j∈N(ui,vi)
xj · (1− |ui − uj|) · (1− |vi − vj|) (4)
where N(ui, vi) are the indices of the 4-pixel neighbors at position (ui, uj).
Similar to how C&W constructs their L2 attack, there are also two components in the objective
function for the spatial transform attack: Ladv (5) to encourage adversarial behavior and Lflow
(6) to limit the amount of transformation.
Ladv = max(max
i6=t
Z(xadv)i − Z(xadv)t, k) (5)
Lflow(r) =
∑
i
∑
j∈N(ui,vi)
√
||∆ui −∆uj||22 + ||∆vi −∆vj||22 (6)
Here, Lflow is the total variation suggested in [17]. The weighted objective is then:
Ltotal(r) = Ladv + τ · Lflow (7)
where τ is often chosen to be 0.1.
This work leads to an interesting direction to generate adversarial examples that are based on
spatial transformation instead of direct pixel perturbations. With this new direction comes with
the need to defend against this line of attack and in this paper, we propose a provable defense
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mechanism against spatially transformed adversarial examples.
3 Attention-based defense against pixel-based attacks
In this section, we explore the use of attention mechanisms to defend against pixel-based adversarial
examples. Specifically, we choose to leverage Latent Attention Network (LAN) [13] as the attention
mechanism because it assumes minimal knowledge about the network. In other words, LAN can
visualize the attention of a black-box model.
3.1 Latent Attention Network
Intuitively, LAN seeks to find the input pixels of an image x that are critical to the output of a
model F . LAN does this by randomly corrupting components of x with noise while measuring the
changes in F (x). Those components that when corrupted lead to minimal changes in F (x) are
not as important as those that lead to large changes. The formal framework can be summarized
in Eq. (8) and (9):
x˜ = A(x) · η + (1−A(x)) · x (8)
LLAN(x) = Eη∼H [LF (F (x˜), F (x))− β · A(x)] (9)
where, A(x) is the corrupted mask generator, η the degree to which to corrupt input x, LF the
loss that was used to train the model, LLAN the final loss to minimize in order to train the Latent
Attention Network.
3.2 Methodology
Fig. 3 shows our detection framework based on LAN. It is characterized by three modules: an
image classifier f1, an attention model g, and a mask classifier f2. The image classifier f1 is a
function F1 : Rd → [0, 1]d, which given input x, classifies it into decision y1. Attention model
g is a LAN, which is a function G : Rd → [0, 1]d, that given an input x, produces an attention
7
Figure 3: Framework of classification-interpretation contrastive detection
mask m = G(x). Attention mask m determines the important components of x that influence the
classification output of a classifier f by corrupting pixels of x with noise drawn from a predefined
distribution and measures the change in f ’s loss. The larger the loss is, the more important the
pixels are. The resulting masks can capture the common features in images of the same class. f
can be any common classifier for x. In our experiments, we directly use f1. The mask classifier
f2 is a function F1 : Rd → [0, 1]l which, given a mask m, classifies it into decision y2. If y2 agrees
with y2, we decide the image is benign and adversarial otherwise.
3.3 Evaluation
We experiment on CIFAR10 [18], with 50,000/10,000 train/test split. We use the same architecture
in [18] for f1 and g, which are AlexNet [19] and a 3-layer Fully Connected Network. f2 is based
on LeNet [15] and trained on the masks produced by g from the training set. We test our method
against three attacks corresponding to different distance metrics: L∞, L0, L2, namely FGSM,
JSMA and CW. In the rest of the paper, adversarial examples are treated as the positive class
and we use x, m, and x∗ , m∗ to denote benign images, attention masks, and their adversarial
counterparts, respectively.
Invariance of mask
We first evaluate the applicability of attention masks to detecting adversarial samples. We generate
attention masks for benign and malicious images using a LAN. Our intuition that attention masks
8
Attack Percentage
FGSM (L∞) 0.863
JSMA (L0) 0.878
C&W (L2) 0.997
Table 1: Percentage of adversarial samples whose attention masks retain their
original classifications.
Figure 4: First row shows one benign image and its three adversarial examples by
FGSM, JSMA, and CW together with their classification results. The second row
presents their corresponding attention masks. Visually, the masks look really similar
to one another despite adversarial perturbations.
of both types of images are very similar is confirmed and the results are shown in Fig. 4. We also
give a statistics analysis on how the mask classification results will change after perturbations. As
shown in Table 1, over 85% of the adversarial samples fail to change their mask classifications, no
matter how they are generated. This discovery and the quality of LANs to generate similar masks
for images from the same class motivate our detection framework.
Detection effectiveness
In the second experiment, we evaluate the effectiveness of the detection framework by comparing
the prediction for image x from classifier f1 against the classification of the mask m of image x.
If they differ, we predict adversarial, and benign otherwise. For each attack method, we take the
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Attack True positive True negative
FGSM (L∞) 0.878 0.614
JSMA (L0) 0.960 0.614
C&W (L2) 0.860 0.614
Table 2: Classification accuracy on adversarial samples generated using different
attacks on AlexNet.
Attack True positive True negative
FGSM (L∞) 0.843 0.665
JSMA (L0) 0.853 0.647
C&W (L2) 0.917 0.750
Table 3: Classification accuracy on adversarial samples generated with different
attacks on VGG-like.
adversarial examples x∗ that successfully fool f1. We pair the same amount of benign images
with adversarial examples to create a test set. The results of our solution against FGSM, JSMA
and C&W are shown in Table 2. Adversarial examples are known to be able to transfer across
models, so we also test our detection framework in a transferred setting. Table 3 shows the results
of our method against adversarial samples generated for VGG-like, a modified VGG network [20]
that has better accuracy than our AlexNet model. Overall, our method shows good true positive
rates: being able to detect adversary when the input image is indeed adversarial, in both direct
and transferred setting. However, the true negative rates across different attacks are low, mostly
under 70%: the mask classifier f2 is confused when presented with a benign example. To figure out
why, we calculate the accuracy of f2 on the produced masks of the test set and we get 60%, which
is quite low, compared to the accuracy of 82% of f1, which classifies raw input images instead of
the derived attention masks. Looking into the 40% of the masks that got incorrectly classified by
f2, we find the problem: those masks are mostly not of the common form of the masks of their
corresponding classes. Figure 5 shows 2 examples.
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Figure 5: (a) and (b) show two examples where LAN produces attention masks with
a totally different class from their corresponding original images.
Attack True positive True negative
FGSM (L∞) 1.000 1.000
JSMA (L0) 1.000 1.000
C&W (L2) 1.000 1.000
Table 4: Classification accuracy on adversarial samples generated using different
attacks on AlexNet, after filtering out the incorrect masks.
Reliability of detection
We then study the quality of the mask generator network and see how it affects our detection
method’s performance. We filter out the masks that are incorrectly produced by LAN and are
left with the 60% of the test set, and generate adversarial samples for those cases. We repeat our
experiments with this smaller data set and get the following results in Table [???]. We achieve
the exactly same results for AlexNet and VGG-like. Overall, when the masks for benign images
are correctly produced by LAN, our detection accuracy is perfect across all the attack methods,
in both direct and transferred settings. What’s more, the recovery rates (retrieving the original
classification of the network despite adversarial perturbations) are also 100%.
4 Certified defense against spatial transformation attack
Besides attention-based defense, we have also explored certified methods that are provable. Draw-
ing inspiration from [14] that proposes a certified framework against pixel-based attacks, we develop
a certificate against spatially transformed adversarial examples. We carry out extensive experi-
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ments and show that a two-layer neural network, when trained with the certificate, becomes more
robust.
4.1 Methodology
For a two-layer neural network, we have f(xˆ) = vTσ(W · xˆ), where v = v+ − v− represents the
weight differences for the positive and negative classes at the second layer, W the weight matrix of
the first layer and σ the activation function, often non-linear. Furthermore, as shown in [21], we
can bound the outputs of a two-layer neural network from an adversarial spatial transformation
input like so:
f(xˆ) ≤ f(x) + max
||z||∞≤1

2
· zTPz (10)
where, P is parameterized as:
P
def
=

0 diag(v)Wdiag(λu) diag(v)Wdiag(λv)
diag(λu)W
Tdiag(v) 0 0
diag(λv)W
Tdiag(v) 0 0
 (11)
and λ is from Proposition 2.2 in [21], which is: the boundary of the ellipsoid defined by ||N ·
vec(r)||2 =  is given by [−λi, λi](1 ≤ i ≤ 2n), where λ2i is the i-th diagonal element of the
matrix (NTN)−1. Here, r is the flow vector defined by spatial transformation attack.
Then, use the fact that zTPz = tr(zzTP ), where tr is the trace operator, we have:
max
||z||∞≤1
zTPz = max
Z=zzT ,||z||∞≤1
tr(ZP ) (12)
By relaxing Z = zzT and ||z||∞ ≤ 1 with Z ≥ 0 and diag(Z) ≤ 1, we have the following convex
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SDP problem:
max tr(ZP )
s.t. diag(Z) ≤ 1
and Z ≥ 0
(13)
This can be efficiently solved using off-the-shelf SDP optimizers. Solving this SDP problem
will yield the certificate, which can be jointly trained with our a model to make it more robust.
4.2 Evaluation
We use 2-layer network that was trained to achieve an accuracy of 98% on the full MNIST test
set. We call this the plain model. Using this model, we compute a certificate using the procedure
above and train it with the plain model to certify it against spatially transformed adversarial
examples, resulting in a certified model. We then attack both models using the same sample of
1000 images randomly drawn from the MNIST test set. The corresponding set of attack targets
is chosen randomly and different from the respective ground true labels. When attacking the
models, we found that the τ variable, which controls the weight between adversarial loss and total
variation loss of the spatially transformed framework, has an significant impact on the success of
an attack. When τ is set too low, the attack can easily fool the model but the resulted image will
be heavily transformed, leading to high level of distortion. On the other hand, when τ is set too
high, the optimizer will try to minimize the transformation as much as possible and the models
will not be tricked, leading to low level of success rate. Thus, to evaluate fairly, we developed an
binary search scheme for , similar to how C&W [3] controls their c variable. We set the lower and
upper bound for τ to be 0.0 and 1000, respectively. If the attack is not successful, meaning the
model is not tricked into classifying the input image as the target class, τ is lowered by setting
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the upper bound to be the midpoint between lower and upper bound. Conversely, if the attack is
successful, we want to get a less transformed image and thus increase by setting the lower bound
to be the midpoint. If the attack cannot produce a successful adversarial image after a certain
max number of iteration, we pronounce it unsuccessful. This scheme increases the average attack
time for each input, but it ensures that we attack both models thoroughly. What’s more, similar
to how [14] bounds the perturbation for each pixel to be 0.1 the largest, we need to bound the
extent of spatial transformation in our attack for the certificate to be meaningful. After many
experiments, we decide to bound the total variation (which is the Lflow loss) to be smaller than
or equal to 7.0. We carry out this constraint in our attack by penalizing any total variation that
is larger than 7.0:
Lflow = max(Lflow − , 0) (14)
where  is the constraint for the Lflow value, and specifically 7.0 for our experiments. All in all,
we found our certified model to be highly effective as suggested in Fig. 6. The certified model is
much less prone to spatial transformation attack, as evidenced in the significantly lower success
rate of the attacks, which is about 70 successful adversarial examples out of 1000 images. On the
other hand, the plain model is much more susceptible to spatial attacks, as there are around 380
successful adversarial examples out of 1000 images attacked.
5 Conclusion and future direction
We propose two novel methods to defend against adversarial examples: one attention-based against
pixel-based attacks and another that is provable and comes with a certificate to defend against
spatially transformed adversarial examples. We carry out extensive experiments to show the
methods’ performance and efficiency.
The attention-based framework is an initial step to utilize a model’s interpretability. Our
method uses an attention mask generator, specifically a Latent Attention Network, to find an
14
Figure 6: Robustness of the plain model and the certified model, measured through
the attack success rate.
input image representation that is invariant regardless of adversarial modifications. We show that
attention masks are resilient against adversarial perturbations and build our adversary detection
based on that property. Our initial experiments provide promising results with a good detection
performance. The framework’s perfect detection accuracy and recovery rates, after filtering out
benign images with incorrect masks, hint at a potential increase in detection accuracy if we can
optimize the quality of the attention mask generator. The proposed method is also attack-agnostic
in that it does not need to know the specifics in adversarial samples generation process. However,
our detection method’s performance is highly dependent on the reliability of LAN and further
experimentation and ideas might be required to see if its quality can be improved. We hope
that this new direction would motivate further research in using attention-based mechanisms to
effectively defend against adversarial examples. One possible idea is to improve the mask generator.
Another is to use a different attention method: we build our work on Latent Attention Network
but there might be other interpretability mechanisms that are better for adversary detection. We
look forward to seeing more robust DNNs with the benefits of interpretability.
What’s more, the certified approach, where we solve for a certificate and jointly train it with
15
the model in question, has shown good performance in defending against spatially transformed
adversarial examples. One particularly interesting direction for future work is a unified framework
that has the benefits of both pixel-based and spatial transformation attack, which might make it
harder to defend against. Similarly but on the flip side, a unified framework for certifying models
can also be developed.
16
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